Congressman Dana Rohrabacher
U.S. Congressman

There is a misconception among today's younger conservatives that working in Ronald Reagan's White House was akin to being a soldier in the Holy Crusades. Oh yes, the image of a united army of believers, marching in step behind good king Ronald, from foot soldier to archer, from mounted knight to the noble lords in the King's immediate entourage, all doing his or her part, with courage and a morally superior cause of driving the infidels from the Holy City and eliminating them as a threat to Christendom. That stereotypical picture is no more an accurate historical image of the Crusades than it is a nostalgic vision of the Reagan White House.

Yes, President Ronald Reagan was a bit like King Richard, at least as he was portrayed in Errol Flynn's 1934 film "Robin Hood". Reagan was a good-hearted leader, with courage and a vision of a better world. The loyalists (deemed "ideologues" in the press) who worked in his administration were always confident that if a request or idea could make it through the obstacles and barriers all the way up the chain to where it actually passed his eyes, or was heard by him directly, the right decision would be made. Ahh!! But getting something important through the system often required the acrobatic combat skills seen in the Robin Hood movie; and real people can't jump that high, run that fast, dodge that successfully or keep their spirits so high while being banished to the wilderness.

Some of us, however, especially the speechwriters, identified with the merrie men of Sherwood Forest. Other times we felt more like underground resistance fighters in occupied Europe. Through it all we always had faith that good would prevail, because the guy at the top, no matter how powerful the forces surrounding him, would do the right thing. In the film, the merrie men of Sherwood knew all would be right if they held out until Good King Richard returned from the Crusades.

This isn't to say that those surrounding our good President were evil characters akin to the villainous Prince John and the Sheriff of Nottingham. But more than a few of the powerful figures around Reagan were undermining the goals President Reagan set out. Goodhearted as he was, he didn't see such malevolence in those around him. Or perhaps, this was part of a strategy, perplexing as it was to us, that he believed worked best in the long run.

Reagan's management style was to bring into his organization as many former opponents as he could, expecting that once they were in the tent they would be helpful, but left outside they would continue to be antagonistic and a hindrance. That is why Jim Baker, who had spent a huge chunk of his life trying to defeat Ronald Reagan politically, was appointed Reagan's Chief of Staff. Baker, a well-tailored, establishment Republican, was one of the 3 men who set up and then ran the Reagan White House for the first 4 years.

The other members of the troika were Mike Deaver, who was close to the first family, but disdained those who were committed to Reagan's political ideals. The third was Ed Meese, who was right-thinking, loyal, and had Ronald Reagan's ear. Unfortunately Ed was a babe in the woods when it came to in-house maneuvering. As the Administration progressed, Ed was just too busy and just too nice to deal with the world class in-fighters he confronted. Nevertheless, his loyal presence in the West Wing of the White House was invaluable.

To accomplish anything, the exhausting internal battles had to be fought and won before the outside game was set in motion. Often the unseen fight inside was far more fierce than taking on the liberal establishment or America's communist enemies. Underscoring this, one only need look back and contemplate that David Gergen was the White House Director of Communications for 2 years. That put him officially in the chain of command between the speechwriters (me) and President Reagan.

During these years, as with all administrations, there were White House leaks from unnamed sources appearing in the press almost weekly. Traditionally, however, leaks out of the White House are helpful to the President, information that for political reasons can't be circulated officially. That's the way it is supposed to work. When David Gergen was Communications Director of the Reagan White House it was different, the leaks were derogatory about President Reagan himself and undermined his agenda. The disloyalty was so obnoxious even liberal columnist like Mark Shields commented on it. After Gergen left his job in 1983, the negative leaks and the vicious jabs by the anonymous White House insider ceased. So it was no surprise when Dave Gergen ended up a few years later being hired to personally advise President Bill Clinton, as he systematically tried to undo every accomplishment of the Reagan Administration.

In stark contrast to a unified and principled crusade, for most of Reagan's administration the infights were draining and frustrating beyond all expectation. Nevertheless, historic accomplishments were made, and the Administration was a success. The ultimate strategy for the loyalists was simply not to give in- to just keep going, never surrender, never resign. They tried to fire us, as Gergen tried to do to me, but if one refused to go without a fight, half the time the good guy would win. In my case, because of my long personal association with Reagan, and because I did a good job writing speeches (not the best, but the fastest), I survived. Most satisfying, I outlasted Gergen. I can now admit that the day he was gone and his office in the West Wing cleared out, I went there and opened a small bottle of Presidential champagne and I drank it down in his empty office.

The fact that Ronald Reagan was as successful as he was, despite many of his own staff being not committed to his goals, is a tribute to the righteousness of his cause and the special person that he was. And in retrospect, his management style of bringing in former adversaries may well be what works, even while it is extraordinarily hard on those expected to carry on the fight inside as well as outside.

During Reagan's second term, Don Regan, who had done a fine job as Secretary of the Treasury, traded places with Jim Baker. After a brief moment of transition, before the new team felt comfortable in asserting their authority, things started to sour as the speechwriters stubbornly refused to mold ourselves into obedient mice. Don Regan, a successful and tough Wall Street CEO could not understand that we worked for Reagan, not Regan. Ronald Reagan had a special appreciation for his speechwriting. Having been in the film business, he valued the creative spark that was the genius of a successful film. He understood the power of communications and the role we played. And, yes, we felt in movie terms like the musketeers, the supreme loyalists, protecting our leader from the murky maneuverings surrounding him, and especially committed to protecting the integrity of his words, which were the crown jewels of policy.

The speechwriters were players not just in shaping rhetoric but also in determining policies. The two go hand in hand when the person you are writing for is the President of the United State and this drove Regan (not Reagan) and his team crazy.

It was in Ronald Reagan's first State of the Union address of his second term that he laid the foundation for what was to be known as the "Reagan doctrine". Only columnist Charles Krauthammer comprehended the historic significance of what was being said.

Yes, as a policy, America would help those who were struggling for freedom. America, no longer on the defensive, would be proactive against Communist tyranny in assisting the oppressed. This ringing message managed to get through the process because this speech proceeded through the system at the time that Jim Baker's management crew was leaving the White House and Don Regan's team was coming in. Anyway, it looked innocuous to the so-called pragmatists. Ronald Reagan, however, knew exactly what he was saying. A new principle was established: America will help those struggling for freedom against Soviet domination of expansionism.

Maybe that is why Don Regan came down so heavily on the speechwriters. As it turned out, articulating the Reagan Doctrine and Reagan's challenges to Gorbechev to "tear down this wall" changed history. The system, even inside Reagan's White House, was set up to thwart such boldness.

For our part we had our own sources of information. Jack Wheeler, a right-wing Indiana Jones figure, was in the field with the anti-Soviet insurgents from Afghanistan to Nicaragua. He'd arrive back to D.C. from a distant 3rd world battlefield and brief us, as well as selected sympaticos in the National Security Council, the Pentagon, and even CIA Director Bill Casey. Yes, we were out to save the world and had no apologies for it.

Over and over again, other White House staffers, like Constantine Menges or Paula Dobriansky, would let us know that a tremendously important pro-freedom policy was about to be deep-sixed (destroyed) only to be saved by President Reagan's personal insistence. The State Department, for example, constantly maneuvered to box in President Reagan so he'd feel compelled to give up his demand that free elections be held in Nicaragua before any cut of American support for the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance (contras). Every time the State Department hacks thought the contras were toast, Reagan said No! Free elections first, disarmament after.

The speeches were no exception. We knew that there were those in the senior staff who would take out all the powerful parts, unless we could get it to Reagan first. Predictably, the senior staff limited our access. In the infrequent speechwriter meetings scheduled, Reagan's wisdom and faith in the American people shone through. Once he heard something good he wanted to say it. In so many cases, like the Berlin Wall speech and Reagan's address to the British Parliament, out of system methods had to be devised to get the good stuff to Reagan, to give him the option of making a historic statement, rather than high-sounding blather. The rulers of the West Wing wanted blather because it was safe and it posed no threat of making anyone angry. Limiting the President's language and options was not Ed Meese's style, however. In stark contrast to the other honchos in the West Wing, when Ed Meese had a difference with the speechwriters he took it, and us, directly to President Reagan for a decision. That's the way it was supposed to be. Early on, I worked on a speech that reinforced President Reagan's stand against a peacetime draft. I included words in the speech that underscored a commitment to making the all-volunteer army work. Ed Meese, an advocate for what he believed would be fair and equitable conscription, strongly disagreed, yet he respected Ronald Reagan. The day after I submitted the speech, I saw Ed in the West Wing and he grabbed me by the arm and said "Let's go see the President for a moment." He dragged me right into the Oval Office. It was late afternoon; the lights were off and President Reagan sat behind his desk somewhat in a shadow. It was a setting fit for the contemplation of historic issues.

Ed sat us down in front of the desk and explained that my speech draft included a reference to making the all-volunteer army work. Ed explained that as we expanded America's military forces a draft might be needed again. There wouldn't be enough volunteers because the number of young people in that age group was limited. So for practical reasons, according to Ed, we should step away from, rather than reaffirm, the President's philosophical opposition to a peacetime draft.

Ed Meese then turned to me and simply said, "Dana now you may want to make your case." Arguing such a fundamental issue in the Oval Office was, let's say, exhilarating. I reminded the President that a peacetime draft was "contrary to our national tradition" and made the case that our goals should be to instill such patriotism in America's youth that they would volunteer. We should hail our defenders as the heroes they are and again make the uniform a symbol of honor and service. If we have faith in our youth, they will come through.

There Reagan sat, leaning back, staring at Ed, then me. He then leaned forward smiling, almost shrugging his shoulders, "Well, Ed, it is contrary to our traditions." Something happened to that speech. My draft was not used and what came out of the process was disjointed and ineffective. However, Reagan managed to slip in the phrase "contrary to our national tradition." It was all worth it. There were many other meetings and in-house debates about conscription in the early months of the Reagan White House. Dr. Martin Anderson, the President's domestic policy advisor, led the charge for an all-volunteer force. Most significantly, in this fight as in so many others, Reagan had the right instincts. Had the draft been reinstated, the left would have used it as an organizing tool against us. All we left them to criticize was our goals of supporting free people and opposing communist tyrants. We won the hearts of a generation of America's youths and the volunteers came. The predicted shortage of recruits never materialized. The "New Patriotism" that President Reagan championed became the positive new force that met our country's needs. It takes faith in one's ideals for such a scenario to succeed.

You see, President Reagan believed in freedom and trusted the American people. It all came back to him and them. He had to juggle hundreds of factors, even fight off the maneuverings of disloyal staff, who unlike Ed Meese, refused to accept that Reagan was the boss, and would always try to make the final call. Reagan managed to carry that burden successfully and take on the great battles of his day, all with a positive spirit and a twinkle in his eye.